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In this paper I would like to concentrate on the network holding together the various 
forms of κρίσις that have emerged in the very recent patristic literature.1 Let me start 
by saying that I am not going to provide improbable systematizations; nor do I 
assume that philosophy should always claim a demiurgic role for itself. I would 
rather try to go through some words and concepts of this debate on the crisis, as if I 
were chasing the melody that they have left behind in my heart, and, in its wake, I 
will produce a harmonization that will not betray the spirit of our theme, while 
exposing it in a different light.  
I have noticed that two principal meanings of the word keep confronting 
each other. On one end of the spectrum, I would put the notion of κρίσις denoting 
the certainty of a judgment, the critical apparatus of a society and the exercise of a 
particular kind of knowledge that divides while excluding. On the other, I would 
place κρίσις understood as uncertainty, as the possibility that this judgment cannot 
be made or formulated. If we could think of these two meanings turning the one 
against the other, as in a particle accelerator, perhaps something like a grammar 
would emerge. There is an active attitude, in which the act of judgment is employed 
as an objectifying device, and there is an attitude that I would like to call deponent, 
in which it is rather the subjectivity that is being manifested, i.e., the uncertainty with 
which the judgment is expected, feared or shunned. Late Antiquity and Late 
Modernity, the periods under scrutiny here, are held together by the alternation of 
these two attitudes.  
Christianity, examined in the depth of its “philosophical life,” has always 
posed the question of the κρίσις, and today it is back to ask philosophy, at a time 
when philosophy appears disoriented – that is, devoid of a guideline towards which 
 
*  Professore Associato  di Semiotica e Filosofia del linguaggio presso l’Università degli studi 
di Macerata. 
1 I will draw inspiration here from an interesting conference on “Crisis and change in Late 
Antiquity” (6-7 April 2016, Dipartimento di Storia Culture Civiltà – Alma Mater Studiorum 
– Università di Bologna) whose Proceedings were edited by Angela Maria Mazzanti and 
Ilaria Vigorelli, Krisis e cambiamento in età tardoantica, ESC, Roma 2017. The present text 
shows a deeply revised and extended version of the paper I gave at the Bologna Conference. 
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one should direct their glance – to avoid the atmosphere of prevailing relativism. In 
my opinion the Cappadocian Fathers remain up to now a turning point between two 
Antiquities in dialogue with each other, for they constitute a valuable model for those 
who love and practise a philosophical form of life. Before entering the tangle of 
questions, though, I would like to analyse the word and the concept of κρίσις in the 




The structures of the Crisis. 
 
Κρίσις as judgment  
To begin with, ἡ κρίσις πολλαχῶς λέγεται, “crisis can be said in many ways,” as is 
witnessed by the history of the word. The hellenist Salvatore Nicosia has 
reconstructed the complex veining of the word in a dense article.2 The linguistic 
approach traces the course of a semantic river that is wide and complex, and which 
flows into the modern notions of “justice” and “crisis.” Both the word, however, and 
the germinal sense from which other meanings are specified one after the other, refer 
to one ancient gesture, which can still be seen in the life of cereal-societies.3 A 
Homeric locus mentions the action of “winnowing,” that is, the separation of chaff 
from wheat, performed by digging in with the spade and then throwing the grains 
mixed with the chaff in the air, so that the wind (or Demeter, among the Greeks) may 
free them from the various impurities.4 The Greek verb κρίνω originally meant “to 
separate”; the sieve, or cribrum in Latin, is the tool that makes the separation 
possible. This is the origin of all the uses accrued by κρίσις in the forms of the 
anthropogenetic process; and κρίσις is judgment, the act of judging. A judgment 
originates as separation or release from a thing or situation; it is a device that shows 
or actualizes a division of linguistic labour. There is a judge and there is the person 
 
2 Salvatore Nicosia, Sul concetto di ‘giudizio’ (κρίσις) in Grecia. Un approccio linguistico, 
in: Idem, Ephemeris. Scritti efimeri, Soveria Mannelli, 2013, pp. 215-228. For a ‘polyphonic’ 
discussion on the topic of judgment, see the Proceedings of the Conference held in Palermo 
in 1997: Il giudizio: Filosofia, teologia, diritto, estetica, ed. S. Nicosia, Rome, 2000. The 
volume includes the first version of Nicosia’s text.  
3 Nicosia, “Sul concetto di ‘giudizio’,” p. 218, maintains that it cannot be doubted that «at 
the basis of the root *krei-/*kri- of κρίνω is the act of ‘separating’ different materials, and 
that this ‘separation’ is the one, fundamental and primary in the cereal societies, of releasing 
the cereals, through a work of constant approximation, from chaff, shells and impurities, until 
an edible fruit is reached».  
4 Homer, Ilias, V. 499-501: ὡς δ' ἄνεμος ἄχνας φορέει ἱερὰς κατ' ἀλωὰς / ἀνδρῶν λικμώντων, 
ὅτε τε ξανθὴ Δημήτηρ / κρίνῃ ἐπειγομένων ἀνέμων καρπόν τε καὶ ἄχνας…, “as in the sacred 
threshing floors the wind carries the chaff | while men winnow, when blond Demeter | under 
the impetus of the winds separates the fruit from the chaff…”.  
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who is judged; there are those who reach an absolution (those who, in the judgment, 
are soluti, i.e., freed) and those who, instead, are condemned, the damnati.  
First of all, what is at stake in a judgment is the separation between two 
levels of analysis: that which is to be objectified and that which is left out. The object, 
i.e., the product of the act of judging, is the sentence, the sententia which assigns a 
predicate to a subject. The operation of judging first posits something as a 
substratum, and then it subjects that substratum to a predicate. Understood in this 
propositional sense, κρίσις has effects over everything that falls under the Concept 
term (or the predicative-ruler). Furthermore, just as the judgment assigns a property, 
so it can remove it and deny it. Here we might ask ourselves: who is the agent that 
performs the judgment? If we consider the subject of the sentence as the author of 
the judgment, then one should say that the assertive proposition, the sententia in its 
canonical form, does not express this subject of the proposition. On the contrary, the 
sentence drops the propositional dynamics and hands them over to the blind spot of 
the linguistic eye. To use philological terminology, we would say that the judgment, 
the sententia puts the subject in a condition of athetesis (i.e. elimination); by 
preventing any subject from claiming the content of the sententia, language turns a 
sentence into the place where a judgment becomes objective. In this way, it is only 
when the subject has been expunged from the sentence that it becomes possible to 
create sciences, laws and moral rules. It is only by separating the product from the 
producer, the known object from the knowing subject that something like a certain 
theoretical thought takes place. Judgment is exercised when the subject takes a leave 
of absence.  
The job of the sentence, however, does not consist simply of hiding the 
subject, in “winnowing” the grain of knowledge, whether communal or collective, 
from the chaff. The sentence is also the place of division – διαίρεσις, as Plato 
understood this operation – and the μερισμός, the division of the parts into which a 
sentence can be articulated.5 Here we do not need to engage in a discussion 
concerning the themes of predication and the form of a sentence, for there are already 
studies that have done this very well. Rather, I would like to stress two points. The 
first, of a syntactic nature, concerns the application of a judgment. What in a 
judgment must be articulated or separated from another thing is not the object as 
Ding an sich, provided that the proper nouns or defined descriptions should be 
enough to carry out this task. Within the context of a proposition (expressed by a 
sentence), the object represents a part only insofar as it is described through the 
predicates that are applied to it. This principle is present in the discussions of the 
philosophers, from Plato onwards, but it was expressis verbis codified first by the 
 
5 This is what the anglophone linguists call parsing, i.e., that part of linguistic analysis that 
is devoted to the recognition of the partes orationis, or μέρη τοῦ λόγου. See J. Lyons, 
Semantics: 1, Cambridge, 1977.  
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logician Gottlob Frege.6 It is the predicate that makes the functioning of the sentence 
possible, in its being applied as a Concept Term to particular Object Terms. Frege 
called this predicate Begriffswort or Begriffsausdruck, that is, ‘Concept Word’ or 
‘Concept Expression’. A judgment, therefore, is a conceptual apparatus that is being 
applied not to objects of experience or things, but to objects known by the language 
and already present in it as Bedeutungen of particular terms. We can say many things 
about the planet Venus: that it shines, that it is a number n of light years distant, or 
that it is uninhabited. And we could say the same or similar things about the celestial 
body that we call “the evening star.” We might not know, however, that Venus and 
the evening star are one, and only one, celestial body. Therefore, we do not assign 
labels to the planet Venus in absolute terms, but to the cultural object “Venus”, as 
this is being known in the language we speak: it is this cultural object which by a 
judgment is placed in the position of an item that is capable of receiving 
predications.7  
 
6 This is the so-called Kontext-Prinzip or the principle of the context. It asserts that the 
meaning of a term should never be investigated in isolation from the others, for the meaning 
is to be sought within the context of a proposition. See G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der 
arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle a. S., 1879. We find 
a similar sentence in ancient logic. In the Sophist (261d), Plato distinguishes between a kind 
of analysis of the terms that abstracts from their syntactic-semantic connection within the 
proposition (ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς) and another kind of analysis that follows from this connection 
(μετὰ συμπλοκῆς). A similar move can be found in Aristotle’s Organon. This question was 
studied both analytically and historically by the philosopher Donald Davidson in one of his 
last works. See Donald Davidson, Truth and Predication, Oxford University Press, Oxford – 
New York 2005. On the important role played by predication within the context of Greek 
patristic philosophy, especially in Gregory of Nyssa, see Marcello La Matina, God Is not the 
Name of God. Some Remarks on Language and Philosophy in Gregory’s Opera Dogmatica 
Minora, in: Gregory of Nyssa: The Minor Treatises on Trinitarian Theology and 
Apollinarism, eds. Volker Henning Drecoll and Margitta Berghaus, Leiden-Boston 2013, pp. 
315-335.  
7 From a semiotic point of view, the question of the categories becomes that of the so-called 
perceptual judgments, whose importance was discovered by Peirce. See Charles Sanders 
Peirce, Semiotica, I fondamenti della semiotica cognitiva, ed. M. Bonfantini, Turin, 1980. A 
reappraisal of Peirce’s categories – which Peirce characterizes as “phaneroscopic” (see Ch. 
S. Peirce, On a New List of Categories, in “Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts 
and Sciences”, 7 (1867), pp. 287-298) – is offered by Umberto Eco in his Kant e 
l’ornitorinco, Milan 1994, pp. 59-81. Here, too, Eco provides a semiotic point of view in 
relation to the so-called “Porphyry’s tree.” See Umberto Eco, “L’antiporfirio,” in: Il pensiero 
debole, eds. G. Vattimo and Pier Aldo Rovatti, Milan, 1983, pp. 52-80. (This debate is 
summarized in A. Cornea, “Umberto Eco’s Encyclopedia vs. Porphyry’s Tree”, in Laval 
théologique et philosophique, 65(2), 2009, pp. 301–320). These semio-philosophical 
questions are very appealing for the scholar of Patristic philosophy, above all for the reason 
that both Eco and many of the semioticians who deal with categories and cognitive types 
seem to ignore the thought of the Cappadocian Fathers, who, on this matter, might have a lot 
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My second consideration is linked to this point. The totality of predications 
that are employed in the language we speak is not a random list of verbal labels, but 
the expression of a system of categories. It was Aristotle who first showed the 
systematic constitution of the ways in which we categorize and judge experience. To 
judge means to say what that particular thing is, where or in what way that thing is. 
One might ask, however, where these categories come from. In Aristotle’s 
Categories, there is a list of ten notions: ten categories are for him ten possible 
predicates. Here it is worth recalling the following remark by Theodor Gomperz: 
“Aristotle ... imagines a man standing before him, say in the Lyceum, and, one after 
another, reviews the questions which may be raised about him. All the predicates 
which can be attached to that subject fall under one or another of the ten heads, from 
the supreme question: what is the object here perceived? down to subordinate 
questions, dealing with mere externalities, such as: what is he wearing?”8 Here a 
caveat is in order: these categories – as reasonably argued by the linguist Émile 
Benveniste – are not independent of the linguistic system in which Aristotle thought 
and wrote, for Aristotle “thought that he was defining the attributes of objects, but 
he only posited linguistic beings: it is the language that, owing to its categories, 
allows us to recognize these attributes and specify them.”9  
If the categories through which we make our judgments are the categories of 
the Greek language, then the judgment does not affect the things in their raw nature, 
but the things as they are already spoken, or at least liable to be spoken, wortbar. 
Using the technical language of philosophers, one might say that the things which 
are dealt with in a judgment are not Dinge, but Gegenstände, i.e., objects which have 
already been placed within a language. To assume that philosophy enjoys a state of 
categorial “virginity” is as naive as to think that a judgment cannot do without its 
linguistic formulations; or, conversely, to think that a judgment can be resolved into 




 Κρίσις as uncertainty  
In my opinion, the triumph of judgment is the triumph of Kantianism. The distinction 
of judgments into analytical and synthetic, on the one hand, and into a priori and a 
posteriori, on the other, establishes the primacy of the judging device, which tends 
to the recognition of its role as κριτήριον. No uncertainty accompanies the 
 
to say. I have explored this subject in the article “Trinitarian Semantics,” in: The Brill 
Dictionary of Gregory of Nyssa, eds. Giulio Maspero and Lucas Francisco Mateo-Seco, 
Leiden-Boston, 2010, pp. 743-748. 
8 Theodor Gomperz, as quoted by H. P. Cook, “Introduction,” in Aristotle, The Categories, 
On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, ed. Harlod P. Cook and Hugh Tredennick, London – 
Cambridge, MA, 1962 [1938], p. 2. 
9   Émile Benveniste, Problèmes de linguistique générale, 1, Paris, 1966, p. 70.  
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philosopher who brings things under his control through his language of concepts, a 
sort of prehensile apparatus designed to grasp all the things he may encounter. To go 
back to Eco’s brilliant book, no platypus will ever be able to avoid linguistic 
categorization, at least as long as Kant overrides Hamann and the Critique of 
Judgment prevails over the “Metacritique of the Purism of Reason”10 or over any 
other philosophy that contests Kant’s schematism. 
 As a matter of fact, much of twentieth-century philosophy has taken 
directions that are different from that outlined by Kant’s Critiques. On the same 
subject, I would mention the criticisms that Willard Quine levelled at Kant’s 
distinction of judgment into “analytic” and “synthetic,” which he considered to be 
one of the dogmas of positivism.11 This kind of criticism represents a turn within the 
‘linguistic turn’ of analytical philosophy. But it is above all with French philosophy 
that the certainty of judgment seems to reach a bold breaking point, after the 
philosophical soil had been tilled by Martin Heidegger. Unfortunately, I cannot 
discuss this topic in all its details. A few remarks, however, will be sufficient to 
articulate our question and move towards a conclusion.  
At the beginning of my paper, I argued that a judgment makes room for itself 
within the space of a sentence. In order to present itself as objective, a judgment has 
to drop any subjective claim. The judgment poses itself as a social object by marking 
out as a spurious element both the judging subject and its Lifeworld, i.e. the world 
in its phenomenological dimension of Lebenswelt. To simplify, I would say that a 
judgment can be exercised provided that the subject gives up its gaze. This removal 
of the gaze emerges every time a subject is being constructed: in science, in 
philosophy and, to a certain extent, in all musical and artistic manifestos. Suffice it 
to mention, for instance, the logic of Protokollsätze in the Vienna Circle, processes 
of mathematization and the dodecaphonic method of Arnold Schönberg and his 
 
10 Referring to Kant’s Table of Categories and, more specifically, discussing the impossibility 
of thinking a judgment without dealing adequately with its “impure” character resulting from 
the fact that any judgment is anyway always formulated in a language, Johann Georg Hamann 
wrote: “If then a chief question indeed still remains – how is the faculty of thought possible? 
The faculty to think right and left, before and without, with and beyond experience? – then 
no deduction is needed to demonstrate the genealogical priority of language, and its heraldry, 
over the seven holy functions of logical propositions and inferences. Not only is the entire 
faculty of thought founded on language, according to the unrecognized prophecies and 
slandered miracles of the very commendable Samuel Heinicke, but language is also the 
counterpoint of reason’s misunderstandings with itself, partly because of the frequent 
coincidence of the greatest and the smallest concept, its vacuity and its plenitude in ideal 
propositions, partly because of the infinite [advantage] of rhetorical over inferential figures, 
and much more of the same.” See Johan Georg Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and 
Language, ed. Kenneth Haynes, Cambridge, 2007, p. 211 (emphasis mine).  
11 Willard Van Orman Quine, Two dogmas of Empiricism, in Id., From a Logical Point of 
View, Cambridge, MA, 1953, p. 47-64.  
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school. These tendencies encompassed all the fields of twentieth-century culture in 
Europe and, after a while, they determined – almost through a chemical reaction – 
the “crisis of judgment,” which then became an epoché, a suspension of judgment. 
According to the logic of scientific positivism, things were taken into account only 
insofar as they were used to formulate theoretical fields; the sounds of modern 
composers were the expression of an abstract and combinatorial syntax, in which the 
form was what counted as the pivotal aspect, while the sounding body was resolved 
into a mere vehicle of the signifying process. Theories of language, anthropology 
and semiotics increasingly became models of aseptic science. Therefore, the objects 
encountered by science are terms and not things. Through its propositions, a scientist 
judges only terms, and not things. By doing so, science reaches a level of nihilism 
with nominalist overtones, which is well represented by the poet’s dictum: nomina 
nuda tenemus. Not by chance, this line is at the end of the most nominalist among 
the treatises of philosophy of language, i.e., The Name of the Rose, the novel by 
Umberto Eco. In other words, the sentence, the sententia of the medieval logicians, 
which expresses the judgment, can do without things, for no science is founded on 
bare things.  
French philosophy has something to say about this absence of gaze. Jean 
Paul Sartre, for instance, draws our attention to the look of the Other: this is the gaze 
that, when it takes me by surprise, makes me feel as if I were being judged by it. 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty redraws the perceptual field by turning its terms upside 
down along the lines of a clearly ontological perspective: the things are looking at 
us. The gaze reappears as the judgment which, amazingly, the things pass onto the 
subject. It is however with the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan that gaze and judgment 
are reunited again. Lacan goes back to Sartre’s words and finely observes that “the 
gaze that surprises me... the gaze I encounter... is not a seen gaze, but a gaze imagined 
by me in the field of the Other.”12 The image, the icon, and not the propositional 
judgment is the place where I enter a relationship with the things I encounter, with 
the Autrui. Indeed, as Lacan makes clear, “[t]he gaze in question is certainly the 
presence of others as such. But does this mean that originally it is in the relation of 
subject to subject, in the function of the existence of others as they are looking at me, 
that we apprehend what the gaze really is?”13  
The answer is in the affirmative: when we deal with the gaze, it is not the 
subject that looks for an object in order to formulate a perceptual judgment on it. The 
subject – Lacan was wont to say – arises only when a signifier emerges; it arises as 
the place of the relationship between signifiers, not as a substratum or a subject that 
assigns (or is assigned) predications. The optic, ‘scopic’ dimension is a path that 
allows us to set up the theme of judgment in a new way. The call to the genuinely 
 
12 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, transl. Alan 
Sheridan, New York, 1981, p. 84.  
13 Ibid.  
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iconic dimension is close to finding its words. “It is through the gaze that I enter light 
and it is from the gaze that I receive its effects. Hence it comes about that the gaze 
is the instrument through which light is embodied.”14 For Lacan, the subject is born 
divided: there is a split that articulates the gaze and the form that is offered to its 
vision. The scopic field that is thus outlined is fulfilled in a painting more than 
anywhere else: seen by a subject, the painting ends up by containing the subject that 
is looking at it. As in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception, here, too, the 
subject is, insofar as it is by the reference to the signifier, seen and looked at by the 
signifying devices in which the subject invests its own desire. In this way, the model 
of judgment can be found not in the act of stating propositions, but in the practice of 
connoisseurship directed towards the analysis of works of art, where the eye of the 
critic or painter lingers on the features shown by the painting, which they are 
supposed to judge. Hence the question: how should we judge a painting? What does 
it mean to formulate a judgment that regards an expanse of colours and lines about 
which not only the mind or the tongue, but even the hand of the painter hesitates?  
Lacan evokes the slow brush strokes of Matisse or Cézanne, the light daubs 
of colour that follow each other apparently without judgment, while a cameraman 
captures the gestures of the painter in slow motion. Lacan interprets these 
movements as a process by virtue of which a subject is split, as the first act through 
which the subject rests his/her gaze (acte de la déposition du regard). Is there a 
theory behind those daubs? Is there a view of matter or of form or of both? And if 
there is such a theory, how are we supposed to assign the form of a judgment? Can 
a painting be beautiful, artistic or true without expressing a viewpoint on art, 
language or matter? And yet, those quick gestures by the painter, those unreflective 
brushstrokes look like automatic responses, movements directed by confidence and 
habit. Still, Lacan discovers in them a temporal dimension, a way of looking at things 
by which the hidden subjectivity is revealed through time:  
  
What occurs as these strokes, which go to make up the miracle of the 
picture, fall like rain from the painter’s brush is not choice, but 
something else. Can we not try to formulate what this something else 
is? Should we not bring the question closer to what I called the rain of 
the brush? If a bird were to paint would it not be by letting its feathers 
fall, a snake by casting off its scales, a tree by letting its leaves fall?15 
 
A judgment, Lacan seems to say, is not the act of a painter, but a gesture: it is not a 
judgment directed to assign qualities or values to an object (whether this is matter or 
form). Rather, a judgment is the recognition of a signifier operating in the field of 
 
14 Ivi, p. 106 (emphasis mine).  
15 Ivi, p. 114. 
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the Other: a subject, Lacan writes more than once, arises when for the first time the 
signifier manifests itself in the field of the Other.  
If that is the case, then the friction of the subject and the signifier becomes a 
judgment because it remains within the bounds of mutual respect; it becomes a 
judgment because it does not judge by reducing the Other to an object, colour to 
matter, human face to form, and so on. The human element that appears in the 
painting is the rain of the brush which encounters matter and tries to listen to it. The 
painterly judgment is not the field of the Kantian subject, which speaks through the 
forms of its disguised subjectivity. It is rather a place where the signifier listens to 
the signifier, where the logos of things can be summoned by the artist and thus be 
heard. This judgment has the mysterious forms of a relationship with the Other.  
In her essay on Greek tragedy, Nicole Loraux investigates this gaze in a sort 
of archaeology of the voice.16 What was the reason, asks the historian, behind such 
a favourable reception of Aeschylus’s Persians, staged in Athens in 472 BC? Did 
perhaps the success result from the representation of the bereavements that the 
Athenians inflicted on the Persians a few years earlier?17 However, if this were the 
case, why did that tragedy not become a model? Why did the subsequent tragedies 
abandon historical plots and prefer to go back to narratives based on the μῦθοι of the 
tradition? But is it then true, Loraux wonders, that the Athenian spectators rejoiced 
when watching the suffering of the Persians? In other words, was the gaze of the 
Greeks one of self-satisfaction? Or did it happen in that particular representation that 
the recognition of oneself manifested itself in the grief of the other? In the first case, 
the scene would work as a screen; in the second, as a mirror. In my interpretation, 
the process of recognition would be very similar to the stade du miroir introduced 
by Lacan in psychoanalytic theory. Loraux maintains that The Persians ushered in a 
form of compassion or empathy within the dialectic, which was very lively in 
Athens, between Athenians and foreigners, between the sense of the self and the 
feeling of the other. If Loraux is right, then we should mark the year 472 as a stage 
in the long history of the notion of κρίσις, for the feeling of compassion aroused by 
the scene challenged the system of categories (Greeks vs barbarians), suspended the 
cultural dialectic and promoted a redefinition of the very notion of ἄνθρωπος.  
Something very similar happens with the establishment of Christianity. Jesus 
before Pilate, the apostles before their judges, the martyrs before their persecutors: 
all these scenes of judgment are pervaded by a grammar of gazes which alternate 
accusation and forgiveness. In his interesting paper Gnilka opportunely reminds us 
that Pilate’s judgment regards the concept of kingship, the truth about the notion of 
 
16 Nicole Loraux, The Mourning Voice: An Essay on Greek Tragedy, transl. Elizabeth 
Trapnell Rawlings, Ithaca, 2002, pp. 66-80.  
17 This seems to be the conclusion, at least if we accept what Aristophanes says through the 
character of Dionysius in The Frogs (the comedy was performed in 405 BC): {ΔΙ.} Ἐχάρην 
γοῦν, ἡνίκ’ ἐκώκυσας περὶ Δαρείου τεθνεῶτος, / ὁ χορὸς δ’ εὐθὺς τὼ χεῖρ’ ὡδὶ συγκρούσας 
εἶπεν· Ἰαυοῖ (1028-1029).  
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king. In the Gospel pericope two models of kingdom were pitted against each other 
and the concept of βασιλεύς was semanticized again. Gnilka then dwells on the 
scenes of martyrdom contained in the Acta Martyrum and, in a persuasive way, 
juxtaposes them to the model of the passio Christi.18 The kind of relationship 
exhibited by the acta is a process of re-semanticization: “A particular semantic 
conflict emerges in the interrogations of the martyrs: Christian martyrs take up a 
notion used by the judge, but they give it a new meaning, which is not understood 
by the pagans.”19 This transfer of meanings can also be used to describe the 
contribution of Christianity to the philosophy of language, for Christianity has 
revealed to the world that the original model of predication (that is, the attribution 
of a predicate to a subject) is a judiciary model: to predicate something of someone 
and to accuse someone of something are expressed in Greek with the same words.20 
During Classical Antiquity justice was administered in the presence of the 
ruler’s icons.21 And, as we know, the icon has the same status as the archetype it 
represents. The judgment occurs under the gaze of the icons, for they are, in a sense 
which is different from that of the ontic, the very ruler in whose name the judgment 
takes place. The κρίσις is the revelation of the violence inherent in the language. This 
violence can be perceived, for it is relegated to the level of the statement. The 
categories constitute the judgment, but they hide the grim gaze of the accusers. In 
the second homily De pauperibus amandis, Gregory of Nyssa reports to his audience 
the strong and frightening impression that he has just had by reading the Gospel 
pericope, where the judgment is announced (Mt 25, 31-46). Gregory is still in the 
grip of the gaze emanating from that scene: Ἔτι πρὸς τῷ θεάματι τῆς φοβερᾶς τοῦ 
βασιλέως ἐπιφανείας εἰμί, ἣν ὑπογράφει τὸ εὐαγγέλιον· ἔτι κατέπτηχεν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὸς 
τὸν φόβον τῶν εἰρημένων ἐνατενίζουσα ὡς καθορῶσα τρόπον τινὰ αὐτόν τε τὸν 
οὐράνιον βασιλέα.22 What does he mean by the words “ὡς καθορῶσα τρόπον τινὰ 
 
18 See Christian Gnilka, Il nuovo senso delle parole: giudice e confessore negli atti dei 
martiri, in Angela Maria Mazzanti, Ilaria Vigorelli, Krisis e cambiamento in età tardoantica, 
Roma 2017, pp. 215-240. For a different interpretation of the linguistic conflict between 
Christian martyrs and pagan judges, see Marcello La Matina, Μάρτυς. Alcune note 
preliminari per una semiotica del martirio, “Lexia. Rivista di semiotic”a, 31–32 (giugno 
2018), pp. 57-80. 
19 See Christian Gnilka, Il nuovo senso delle parole, p. 217. My translation. 
20 See, for instance, Aristoteles, Categ., 3 a 19-20: τὸν γὰρ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγον κατὰ τοῦ 
τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγορήσεις καὶ τὸν τοῦ ζῴου. 
21  Gregory of Nyssa recalls this use of the icon in a passage of his homily De Beneficentia, 
when he writes «ὥσπερ οἱ τὰς βασιλικὰς εἰκόνας κατὰ τῶν βιαζομένων αὐτοὺς 
προβαλλόμενοι, ἵν' ἐκ τῆς μορφῆς τοῦ κρατοῦντος τὸν καταφρονητὴν δυσωπήσωσιν»; 
Gregorii Nyssae, “De Beneficentia”, in Gregorii Nysseni De Pauperibus amandis orationes 
duo, ed. Adrianus van Heck, Leiden 1964, p. 9, 2-4. 
22 Gregorii Nyssae, “In illud: Quatenus uni ex his fecistis mihi fecistis”, in Gregorii Nysseni 
De Pauperibus amandis orationes duo, ed. Adrianus van Heck, Leiden 1964, p. 21,1-4.  
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αὐτόν τε τὸν οὐράνιον βασιλέα”? Is he perhaps highlighting the iconic power of 
writing?  
Now, the phrase “turned in a way towards the celestial king himself” may 
perhaps mean that the representation of the Gospel works as an icon. The power of 
the icons is so strong that Gregory can only with difficulty go back to the textual 
dimension, as if he were detained “in the midst of the events recounted in the text,” 
so much so that he cannot see anything else: Οὕτω δέ μοι τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸν τῶν 
ἀνεγνωσμένων φόβον διατεθείσης, ὡς πρὸς αὐτοῖς δοκεῖν εἶναι τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ 
τῶν παρόντων ἐπαισθάνεσθαι μηδενός, οὐδεμίαν ὁ νοῦς ἄγει σχολὴν πρὸς ἄλλο τι 
βλέπειν τῶν προκειμένων εἰς ἐξέτασίν τε καὶ θεωρίαν τῷ λόγῳ.23 The gaze of the 
judgment is the gaze of the text, every time this functions in an iconic way, that is, 
when it makes the gaze of the archetype present. The content of this gaze, however, 
is not ontic, but ontological: it requires that the human gaze be turned towards the 
others not as they are in a phenomenal sense, but as they are in the truth of the human 
condition established by the judgment. Therefore, Gregory says, one should avoid 
behaving like the Levite and the priest, who, going from Jerusalem to Jericho, left 
the poor wayfarer in the state in which he had been left by the robbers. They did not 
look at what the man was, but at the way in which he appeared to their eyes. The 
Gospel places before us the human condition and prescribes that we should not 
ignore our resemblance to the features of our common nature (τὸ μὴ ἀλλοτριοῦσθαι 
τῶν κοινωνούντων τῆς φύσεως)24.  
The gaze should grasp not the phenomenon, but the truth, which, in spite of 
the phenomenon, preserves itself in an ontological sense. This ontological content is 
also in the type of gaze that Gregory asks his listeners to direct towards the poor 
whom they have before their eyes every day. “You don’t consider” – he tells his 
listener – who the person is in this condition? Everyone is made in the image of 
God,” – including all that follows from it – οὐ λογίζῃ τίς ὁ ἐν τούτοις ὤν; ὅτι 
ἄνθρωπος, ὁ κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ γεγονώς, ὁ κυριεύειν τῆς γῆς τεταγμένος, ὁ ὑποχείριον 
τὴν τῶν ἀλόγων ὑπηρεσίαν ἔχων.25 Precisely because he is disfigured, this man 
appears to you as a phenomenal datum of difficult interpretation (οὗτος εἰς τοῦτο 
συμφορᾶς καὶ μεταβολῆς προῆλθεν, ὥστε ἀμφίβολον τὸ φαινόμενον εἶναι)26. On the 
one hand, you cannot count him among the members of human society; on the other, 
you cannot consider his physical features as belonging to a given species of living 
being different from men. Gregory’s Greek language uses plenty of terms related to 
the semantic sphere of seeing, portraying and depicting: ἐὰν πρὸς ἄνθρωπον εἰκάσῃς, 
 
23 Gregorii Nyssae, In illud: Quatenus uni ex his fecistis mihi fecistis, p. 22, 8-12. 
24Ivi, p. 24, 4-5. 
25 Ivi, p. 26, 8-11. 
26 Ivi p. 26, 12. 
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ἀρνεῖται τὴν ἀμορφίαν ὁ χαρακτὴρ ὁ ἀνθρώπινος· ἐὰν πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα τρέψῃς τὴν 
εἰκασίαν, οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ φαινομένου προσίεται.27  
By their living under the gaze of the Lord the wretched are indeed the ones 
who can determine either our condemnation or our salvation, not by accusing us, but 
by indicating a ‘deponent’ mode of judging: «οὗτοι καὶ κατήγοροι σφοδροὶ καὶ 
συνήγοροι ἀγαθοί· συνηγοροῦσι δὲ καὶ κατηγοροῦσιν, οὐ λέγοντες, ἀλλ' ὁρώμενοι 
παρὰ τοῦ κριτοῦ. τὸ γὰρ περὶ αὐτοὺς γενόμενον ἔργον παρὰ τῷ καρδιογνώστῃ βοᾷ 
παντὸς κήρυκος εὐσημότερον».28 Insofar as ὁρώμενοι παρὰ τοῦ κριτοῦ, the wretched 
work as icons where the πρόσωπον, the gaze of the Lord can be truly deposed.  
 
 
Krisis as “the time that remains” 
 
Late Antiquity and Late Modernity 
In recent human studies it has become usual to term the contemporary time as Late 
Modernity. In this use the expressed notion of time has not only a syntagmatic value. 
It does not serve only to link the present age with the previous one—namely, 
Modernity tout court. The expression ‘Late Modernity’ has a paradigmatic value, for 
its intended meaning introduces a relation per distans between the present age and 
the age designated by historians as Late Antiquity. Therefore, Late Modernity should 
be viewed not only as the time that comes after Modernity, because this would risk 
evidencing the mere “after” of a contingent temporal succession. On the contrary, 
the paradigmatic relation involves also the content of time that can be related, in 
absentia, to the Late Antiquity sense of time. Both ages are forms of being-late, still 
better of χρονίζειν. Late Antiquity and Late Modernity can be considered as parallel 
expressions, referring perhaps to comparable modes of being-late. The former is 
subsequent to the end of paganism and marks the beginning of the Early Christian 
age. The latter results from the unravelling of the Middle Ages’ view of western 
Christianity as the restoration of the Roman Empire. Both are recognized by their 
contemporaries as well as by modern writers as ages of crisis, though of course in 
different senses. In what follows I would like to evaluate the deep significance of the 
former age of crisis and its visible reflexes upon late modern anxiety and crisis.  
An inescapable starting point is the following. As Christians, we exist in the 
time that goes from the ἀνάληψις to the παρουσία of the Lord. Had the promises of 
Christ been realized in the Apostolic Age, no one nowadays would be asking 
questions like these. Nevertheless, the promises have not yet been fulfilled, and 
thanks to this gap many theologians theorize the Christian God as being late. The 
Messiah, the Bridegroom, the Lord is late. If we were now to bring this hypothesis 
back to our present concern, we might say—according to some contemporary 
 
27Ivi, p. 26, 14-17. 
28 Gregorii Nyssae, De Beneficentia, p. 9, 7-11. 
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theologians—that our entire existence is due to Christ’s being-late, or better that we 
all exist inside the χρονίζειν of Christ, of the Messiah. Late Modernity is not the time 
of God’s absence, but only that of its delay. He is late, but in a mysterious way, he 
is in a relationship to our condition as humans. He is ὁ ἐρχόμενος, the one who is 
coming. In the second homily De pauperibus amandis the Cappadocian writer 
Gregory of Nyssa pointed out to his listeners how significant the question of the 
παρουσία /ἀπουσία of Christ is:  
 
[H]owever, these matters are not insignificant nor unworthy of our examination, that 
is, to know him who exists eternally. “Behold, I am with you always” (Mt 28.20). If 
we believe that [Christ] is with us now, how will he come since he is proclaimed as 
not being present? If “in him we live and move and have our being” (Acts 17.28), as 
the Apostle [Paul] says, our efforts within the limitations of time can neither grasp 
nor embrace him who contains everything. This applies to the present as well as to 
the future. I see that any being near or surrounding the throne surpasses whatever 
belongs to the present age.29 (tr. Roger Pearse) 
 
Let us ask ourselves now: “Is Late Modernity the time of χρονίζειν in a way 
comparable to the χρονίζειν of Late Antiquity?” or “Do we exist in the mystery of 
the Bridegroom, as men of Late Antiquity also did?” Of course, our attitude toward 
the deferment of promises is maybe less nagging and sincere than in the past. 
However, they are anything but unimportant questions for late-modern people. In 
order to explain this being-late, the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben used the 
notion of ‘operative time’30—elaborated by the linguist G. Guillaume to elucidate 
the architectonics of verbs—though applying it to the problem of defining Messianic 
time.  
 
Messianic time is the time that time takes to come to an end, or, more 
precisely, the time we take to bring to an end, to achieve our representation of time. 
This is not the line of chronological time (which was representable but unthinkable), 
nor the instant of its end (which was just as unthinkable); nor is it a segment cut from 
chronological time; rather, it is operational time pressing within the chronological 
 
29 Gregorii Nyssae, In illud: Quatenus: in Gregorii Nysseni De pauperibus amandis orationes 
duo, ed. Adrianus van Heck, Leiden Brill, 1964, p. 22, 12-21. 
30 Cf. Giorgio Agamben, The Time that remains. A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, 
English translation by Patricia Dailey, Stanford Univ. Press, Stanford, Ca, 2005. 
 p. 65-67. His reference is to the category of G. Guillaume’s “operational time”. See 
Guillaume, Temps et Verbe. Théorie des Aspects, des modes et des temps dans les langues 
classiques, Champion, Paris 1970). Operational time has perhaps some connection with the 
so-called time of mental rotation, discovered via experiments by the scholars Roger N. 
Shepard, Jacqueline Metzler, Mental Rotation of Three-Dimensional Objects, 
“Science” (1971) Feb 19, 171(3972), pp. 701-3. 
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time, working and transforming it from within; it is the time we need to make time 
end: the time that is left us.31 
 
The critical findings of the philosopher oblige us to pay attention to the 
structures involved in Messianic time, if considered as the time of judgment. 
Messianic time is not an additional time (it is not a χρόνος), but a quality, or an 
aspect, concealed in particular times as their καιρός. In Agamben’s words, it is the 
time that remains to us—as well as to every man in every time—and that is disclosed 
for us as a delay. In Walter Benjamin’s words, it is “the gate” through which the 
Messiah could enter our room.  
 
 
Krisis and the Digital Swarm 
This is the reason why we consider it necessary to construct a parallel reflection 
between Antiquity and Modernity. On the preceding pages we investigated the 
twofold sense of κρίσις that is shown by this juxtaposition. On the one hand, we find 
κρίσις as a judgment and, on the other, κρίσις as a possibility that this judgment will 
not come. Now, the moment has come for seeing whether the crisis of our time is, or 
is not, the expectation of a judgment that is not yet manifested. By studying the 
Fathers with an eye open to contemporary philosophy, one might observe the friction 
between historical and philosophical knowledge. In fact, what sometimes makes 
historians “shudder” is often, contrariwise, what appears to be the very “salt” in a 
philosophical discourse: hypotheses. A friction might exist not only between the two 
senses of the word krisis, but also when different methods approaching such a krisis 
are compared.  
At the beginning of the new millennium both the existential and the 
ontological notions of crisis began to make their appearance. They deeply affect the 
definition of human beings, philosophical anthropology or, as it is sometimes 
referred to, the becoming-human of man as animal rationale. Joining this debate, the 
Korean philosopher Byung-Chul Han talked about the crisis in a concise book called 
In the Swarm, Digital Prospects.32 The object of his reflection is the so-called virtual 
world, namely the world of augmented reality. He considers the digital world as a 
condition capable of determining important changes in the human way of life, 
dismantling—as he writes—the real and totalizing the imaginary.33 Our vision and 
our gaze are questioned by the network. In particular, Han argues that digital people 
are living in a real “poverty of gaze”: «Digital communication is visually poor 
communication. [...] Camera optics alone are not responsible for the fact that we are 
 
31 Giorgio Agamben, The Time that remains, 67-68; Agamben’s italics. 
32 Byung-Chul Han, In the Swarm, Digital Prospects, English translation by Erik Butler, 
MIT, Cambridge (Ma) - London, 2017. 
33 See B.-C- Han, In the Swarm, p. 22. 
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staring past each other. Rather, it points to a fundamentally missing gaze – that is, to 
the missing other. The digital medium is taking us farther and farther away from the 
other».34 The digital condition, as the network exemplifies it, has erased the semiotic 
distinction between proximal and distal. In this way, it has given up, both for subjects 
and objects, the possibility of adaptation—where adaptation is the opportunity for 
reciprocity:  
 
Tapping around on the touchscreen has consequences in regard to the 
other. Such motion eliminates the distance that constitutes the other in 
its otherness. One can swipe or tape the image – touch it directly – 
because it has already lost its gaze, its countenance. Pinching the 
touchscreen places the other at my disposal. We tap, swipe, or flick the 
other away so that our own mirror image will appear instead.35  
 
Han disagrees with the enthusiasm some humanists have shown relative to 
the improvements of the Internet. He is also critical of the optimism of some 
Churches as to the possibility of using the network to optimize the life of the ecclesial 
communities as such. One of the most convinced proponents of the network is the 
philosopher Vílem Flusser36, against whom the arrows of the Korean philosopher are 
directed: 
 
Over and over, Flusser exalts networked communication into the 
religious sphere. Here, the telematic ethos of networking is supposed to 
correspond to “Judeo Christianity with its commandment, ‘Love Thy 
neighbour’”. For Flusser, digital communication harbours a messianic 
potential; [...] Following this logic, digital communication has 
inaugurated a kind of Pentecostal communion. It frees the individual 
human being from isolation within the self by summoning forth spirit, 
a resonance chamber37. 
 
In this debate on the krisis springing from the “digital” condition of late modern 
mankind, the religious element too also unexpectedly emerges. On the one hand, 
Flusser introduces both the Pentecostal community and the Messianic prospect into 
the universe of discourse as the very end of the crisis. Both the late modern crisis 
 
34 See B Byung-chul Han, In the Swarm, pp. 23-4. 
35 Byung-chul Han, In the Swarm, Digital Prospects, pp. 24-5; the Italian version of the text 
contains in addition the following words: «Dispongo dell’Altro come se lo tenessi tra pollice 
e indice». These words summarizing the entire paragraph are missing in the English edition 
we are quoting from.  
36 Han refers to Vílem Flusser, Kommunikologie weiter denken. Die Bochumer Vorlesungen, 
Fisher-Taschenbuch, Frankfurt/Main, 2009. 
37 Byung-chul Han, In the Swarm, Digital Prospects, p. 47. 
187 
 
and the Internet’s promised redemption should have played, in his opinion, the role 
of the battlefield, where a sort of restoration of true communication should take 
place. On the other hand, Byung-Chul Han dismantled Flusser’s project as 
inconsistent. According to the Korean philosopher, departing from the crisis entails 
the acknowledgement that no Digital Messianism did—or shall—take place. The 
public space of reason is marked by egotism and narcissism: so, the digital network 
does not work as a dialogic medium for realizing human projects, but rather as a 
projectile—as he writes—a bullet that the subject fires against him- or herself.  
Of course, Han’s notion of delay in keeping promises is not comparable to 
the patristic notion of the being-late of the Lord. Nonetheless, what is striking is that 
in both cases the temporal dimension is concerned as the very place for the proper 
understanding of the question of human salvation. In one case, a salvation from 
nature is concerned, whilst, in the other, the flying away from the solipsism of the 
digital swarm is under discussion. At any rate, something expected did not occur. 
Apart from any detailed remarks, the image of a missed completion of time is 
nonetheless a powerful stimulus for encompassing the field of our inquiry. The 
reference to the messianic perspective of the notion of krisis seems to support 
Agamben’s analysis of present times as manifesting the operational aspect of time. 
This provisory conclusion seems to drive us to acknowledge the being-late of time 
as the remnant dimension of the salvation time (the καιρός or τὸ ἔσχατον).  
 
 
Krisis as the servomechanism of a digital ideology 
In the Sixties the sociologist Marshall McLuhan persuasively argued that the subject 
interacting with computers and similar devices becomes a sort of servomechanism 
for them. He or she cannot remain as the agent of actions, for he/she is not capable 
of a true agency. Rather, he/she seems to be the subject (ὑποκείμενος) overridden by 
‘manipulative’ agents and instruments. He or she can, of course, subjugate others to 
the network, but he/she cannot avoid submitting him-herself to the network. The user 
of the network is a watching subject: he/she is there, above all, to observe. He/she is 
watching everything others write and whatever way others live. Then, from time to 
time, he or she ratifies some images with a “Like”.  
If we assume that taking-place in communication mostly means being able 
to promote changes, then we must exclude that the Internet surfer described above 
could dislocate him- or herself in this sense: taking place in a judgment means above 
all to take (vs to abandon) a position among other actors relative to a disputed matter. 
This sense is expressed prevalently in the judgment, whose vehicles are in most cases 
propositions. The propositional form is the form by which the subject assumes a role 
with respect to a state of affairs or a person. The relevant question then emerges: “To 
what extent does the digital condition allow the linked subjects to take a position, or 
to formulate judgments?”  
188 
 
Of course, if we treat the Internet Like’s as judgments, there is no doubt that 
the network leaves a lot of space for acts of krisis. But what a real judgment expresses 
is not a passing sensitivity or a provisional attitude towards something or someone. 
Judgment sentences work in societies rather as arguments-for (or evidence-against) 
something or someone. So, let me wonder: “Does the network allow judgment in this 
sense?” Answering this question implies moving our focus onto the actors of the 
judgment. In fact, in the judgment these relationships are what the judgment itself is 
about. In the judgment the grammatical personae (‘I’, ‘you’, ‘it’) are moved—this is 
why pronouns and other indexes are also called shifters. One thing that is often 
overlooked is the role of such words in the context of a sentence. The personae of 
grammar, i.e. the shifters, do not work in the network the same way they do in face-
to-face utterances or in written communication sentences. They are indicators of 
proximity, expressions of distance, or, in a word, indexes: their use presupposes a 
Person-Deixis context. 
Let’s provide an example. Suppose a biblical text is published on a site. Any 
Internet surfer can assume the role of reader, positioning him- or herself as the ‘you’ 
of that text or of its author’s. However, the pronouns in that text will remain 
configured according to the author’s/network-master’s intended meaning. No user 
or surfer of the network could really “wear” any personal pronoun; nor can he or she 
wear any persona other than him-or herself. He/she cannot make a text his/her own. 
What he or she can do is just spell and visualize a text. Rigorously speaking, we 
cannot classify such acts as acts of reading capable of changing the truth conditions 
or the reference of texts. Suppose a surfer reads the passage where the prophet Isaiah 
says, “The spirit of the Lord is upon me.” The pronoun ‘me’, uttered in a synagogue 
proclamation works as an index for the subject of enunciation: in our example it 
refers to Isaiah and not to the reader. Contrariwise, on any computer screen, it works 
as just a rigid designator, a term that will necessarily refer to a given entity. Of 
course, the Internet user, if he or she wants to, can post a comment on Isaiah to a 
friend, can share that piece with other surfers, can highlight the text or a part of it. 
But he/she will never be able to make the personal pronoun refer to individuals other 
than the one intended by the author. The position of the ego remains with Isaiah. 
This happens, in my opinion, because shifting persons (or, more simply, 
casting the grammatical personae into one another) is the same as permitting the 
sentence to become open – in the logical sense of any ‘open sentence’. Amazingly, 
this casting of persons into one another does not happen in the network verbal 
communication, for any text (or part of a text) appearing on the Internet is to be taken 
as it was formed by the quoted sentence. This being so, any indexical expressions 
behave as if they were in invisible quotation marks; so they cannot be disquoted. 
Texts or sentences uploaded on the Internet are by default closed. They are blocked, 
even when they are modifiable or modified. These invisible quotation marks cannot 
be removed. The same applies to images and pictures or movies when uploaded to 
the network and shared with other surfers on the Internet.  
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Vice versa, in the oral-written and face-to-face communication, it is possible 
for the reader to take-position by casting his or her persona into another:38 he/she 
can “move” and locate him-herself through his/her choices relative to prosody or 
melody or any other features characterizing any act of vocal reading accomplished 
before other creatures. What prevents pronouns from casting into one another within 
or throughout the network is the absence of ‘ratified participants. Anyone who reads 
a text on the web either remains a passive reader or becomes a new author (he/she 
can write and post comments, and so on); but nobody who reads a text on the Internet 
is in the position of becoming Animator of that text.39 
Becoming a text Animator would be the same as performing a text in the 
position typical of the homilist.40 This is precisely what happens to Jesus—according 
to the narrative of the Gospels—when he proclaims that passage of Isaiah: «The 
Spirit of the Lord is upon me». By uttering Isaiah’s sentence—enclosing its first 
person indexical ‘me’—Jesus is not quoting the ego of the prophet/author. Rather, 
he is casting his own person in the persona of the enunciation, by referring Isaiah’s 
statement to himself. This is possible for he performs before a living community of 
given listeners. Jesus reads the other’s text; however, he is not quoting: how so? We 
are sure he does not quote, because he changes the truth conditions of the text with 
his reading. And he changes them because he is in a position to do so because he acts 
as a speaker and not as an interpreter, as a dialogue or as a reading servomechanism. 
The expression “casting grammar personae into one another” is used here as 
meaning the shifting process taking place in the practice of “absorbing” the Other’s 
persona while reading or uttering a text. Emphasis is on the non-psychological 
meaning of this process. Examples of such a casting of grammar personae are 
 
38 As to the “casting” in the Old and New Testament’s patristic interpretation see M. La 
Matina M. La Matina, Seeing God Through Language. Quotation and Deixis in Gregory of 
Nyssa's 'Against Eunomius', Book III, in “Studia Patristica”, LXVII (2013), Leuven, Peeters, 
pp. 77 – 90. 
39 The sociologist Ervin Goffman introduced this term. Animator is the person who reads or 
performs a text before the audience. His or her role should be distinguished from that of the 
Author, who is responsible for the mere linguistic formulation of a text. By these terms 
Goffman aims at replacing the fuzzy notion of Speaker. In addition, instead of the usual term 
Hearer, Goffman tends to introduce the pair Ratified participants, the intended addressee, 
and Overhearers, every unintended or undesired participant in the act of communication. 
This terminology is established in: E. Goffman, Forms of Talk, Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 
Philadelphia 1981. 
40 Homelists (from the old Greek word ὁμιλία ‘talk’) were—and are even now—the readers, 
or the holy ministers, in charge of commenting on the proclaimed passages of the Holy 
Scripture in the weekly holy service. They appeared first in the Synagogue-assembly, where 
the talk was called derashà, and then in the Christian ekklesia, where it was termed homilia. 
The semantic and pragmatic role of their performances into the rituals received new light 
through the studies of Maurice Sachot. See M. Sachot, L’invention du Christ. Genèse d’une 
religion, Odile Jacob, Paris 1998.  
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usually given in plays, in concerts as well as in many other types of text performance; 
a special interpretive casting—with ontological consequences—is shown in the 
Christian late antique homiletics.41  
The verb χρονίζειν refers to the time of the Other’s appearance, for—as 
Levinas argued—there is no time where there is not the other.42 The coming of the 
other is his παρουσία, it is his making himself present as other. Since the first three 
decades of the 20th century philosophers such as Martin Heidegger had investigated 
the sense of such a παρουσία in a new ontological perspective. According to his line 
of thought, παρουσία is not to be intended as mere presence, or Anwesenheit. 
Heidegger connected the inquiry on Being with the notion of Time, refusing the 
traditional view of truth as adaequatio rei et intellectus. Through this move, he also 
renounced the Cartesian cogito as the ground for any philosophical investigation. 
The Being-in-the-World of the Dasein is neither intended by Heidegger as Descartes 
or Kant’s παρουσία; nor as the co-occurrence of Dasein and the beings—as they 
were a Subject/Object pair redivivus. Rather, it emerges from the disclosure of 
beings coming from somewhere over the passing of time.43 The dimension of time 
enters vehemently into the study of Being. The assertive proposition (the Aristotelian 
ἀπόφανσις) is not yet the place for the truth of human judgment. Truth is operative 
in the ek-static time of the Dasein, whose existence cannot coincide with the mere 
presence of a collection of things. It is a notable question whether such an ἔκστασις 
could be read by a language-oriented philosophy as having to do with the utterance 
indicators called shifters. I do not deal here with this question, but refer the reader to 
my previous paper.44  
At the end, the curious reader could wonder: “What can the Fathers of the 
Church teach contemporary man about krisis?” The very recent literature on this 
topic (see the papers collected in Vigorelli and Mazzanti 2018) does not just offer 
data, but attempts answers. If I were to provide my own response, I would stress that 
the late antique Fathers could offer an excellent antidote for late modern societies. 
To us, who always live under the power of rules, of images, and under the persistent 
gaze of others, late antique Patristics can indicate an escape route. This way out is 
 
41 The semantics of the 4th century Greek homiletics—especially the Cappadocian’s—was 
the main topic of the paper by M. La Matina, Does Homily work as a Theory of Truth? A 
possible bridge for Patristics and Philosophy of Language, in “Scrinium. Journal of 
Patrology and Critical Hagiography”, 11, 2, 2015, pp. 261-280. 
42 See Emmanuel Levinas, Le temps et l’autre, PUF, Paris 2005. 
43 As the main reference for these remarks see Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Niemyer, 
Tübingen 1927. An interesting reading of Heidegger’s perspective from a Christian point of 
view is to be found in Χρήστος Γιανναράς, Τὸ Πρόσωπο καὶ ὁ Ἔρως, Δόμος, ᾽Αθῆναι, 4. 
ἐκδοση, 2006. 
44 See Marcello La Matina, ‘As for God, so for Sound. Engaging with Yannaras’ Philosophy 
of Language’, in Sotiris Mitralexis (ed.), Engaging with Yannaras’ Thought. Polis, Ontology, 
Ecclesial Life, with Preface by John Milbank, Clarke & Co., Cambridge 2018, pp. 133-150. 
191 
 
the way of the icon as a person-style mode of knowledge. Unlike conceptual 
knowledge that aims at representing the essence of beings, the icon represents the 
person. It presupposes the personal dimension and, where this is lacking, it institutes 
it. This aspect is currently the focus for an interesting debate among contemporary 
scholars. Sometimes, in our studies, the West has been opposed to the East as to the 
modes of knowledge each one has developed. We often hear that the West has 
developed a form of conceptuality resulting in hard rationalism, whereas the East 
has only elaborated a mystical or poetic path to knowledge. Both these judgments 
should sooner or later be corrected. One of the protagonists of the debate is the 
philosopher Χρήστος Γιανναράς, from whom I quote the following lines :  
 
The Greek East understood the image as a means for expressing the 
truth of persons and things, and spoke an iconic language that signified 
the disclosure of the person of God and the person of humankind. Image 
is the signifier of personal relation, the “logical” disclosure of personal 
energy as invitation to communion and relation. […] It does not 
represent a static signified thing or substance, or substitute a reality or 
fact simply by an example, but discloses a personal energy invitatory to 
communion and relation, and preserves the character of knowledge as 
a fact of dynamic relation45. 
 
We are always under the eye of some image, but contemporary images—like the 
icons of the Emperor’s power—are blocked, are conceptually conceived. The 
Internet works as a powerful dispositive subjugating to its images the lives of every 
sentient being. It expresses a logical cloture and has no personal energy. It does not 
disclose, but substitutes the reality of beings by means of simple avatars. Internet 
does not invite communion but rather connection. Its judgments are static formulae, 
not opening sentences to the participants of the Person-Deixis dimension. Things 
happen as in the novel Flatland, written by Abbott: a two-dimensional world is the 
theatre of a cloture that forestalls any event. Salvation could be flying away into 




Concluding Remarks  
I hope I have been able to demonstrate that the connection between Late Antique and 
Late Modern ideologies of the ‘Krisis’ / ‘crisis’ could enlighten our grasp of the 
anxiety typical of contemporary human beings. To corroborate my point further, I 
 
45 Χρήστος Γιανναράς, Τὸ Πρόσωπο καὶ ὁ Ἔρως, Δόμος, ᾽Αθῆναι, 4. ἐκδοση, 2006. (English 
edition—which we quote from—translated by Norman Russell, Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 
Brookline, Ma, 2007, p. 184). 
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would like to share with you a few suggestions so that we can think over together 
the crisis of the gaze caused by the end of an active, positive view of judgment. The 
act of judgment is connected to processes of conceptualization and to the exercise of 
a discriminating faculty. Its original model is, on the one hand, that of the hunter 
gatherer civilizations, which were based on the ability to sort the nutritive elements 
and keep them pure from any disturbance and contamination. In the image of 
“winnowing” we can detect a typical trait that characterizes the development of the 
oral civilizations, that is, structural amnesia. These civilizations select memories and 
constantly separate them from everything that might alter the balance with the 
environment and the cohesion among the members of a given community. In this 
stage of anthropogenesis, the act of judgment is therefore a concrete device, whose 
value is subject to mechanisms of social endorsement that are linked to food, 
nourishment and the cycle of wheat. Later on, with the gradual adoption of writing 
technologies, the act of judgment establishes itself within the most powerful product 
of writing: the sentence. This is what allows the speaker to distil the semantic content 
that needs to be preserved while releasing it from the contingency of its bearer, i.e., 
the speaker uttering this or that sentence. In this way, the sentence fulfils the 
judgment, discarding the level of the statement (that is, the level of subjectivity), as 
if this were chaff. The judgment thus becomes objectifying.  
Already in the Greek tradition, however, this active form of judgment 
underwent a contrary reaction of equal, if not stronger power. Especially in the 
theatrical culture of the Greeks, a ‘deponent’ conception of judgment emerges: the 
self is mirrored in the other, the Greek in the barbarian. A deponent view of judgment 
arises as a device for ruling differences. Consequently, the Greek theatre – always a 
source of compassion capable of channelling fear and pity – becomes the means by 
which humanity replaces citizenship, community supersedes society. When 
Christianity establishes itself, it announces something that is certainly new, but that 
is also able to pervade the minds as a result of the ‘empathetic’ sensibility known in 
the Hellenized world and from there radiating throughout the oikoumene. This is the 
picture that I have here sketched out to understand the world of Late Antiquity. 
Today, the presence of social media and technologies that convert the gaze into a 
logic of distancing leads to a model of judgment that aims to debase the other, to 
assimilate it following modalities that are not altruistic, but of a vampire-like nature. 
The twentieth century has left the question of the judgment open, splitting it into two 
segments: on the one hand, science, with its almost automating protocols; on the 
other, that particular system of phenomena that John Rawls facetiously defined as 
‘comprehensive doctrines’: religions, beliefs, mythologies and even continental 
philosophy could enrich this domain.  
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John Rawls,46 however, proved to be lacking in foresight; which is a limit in 
a scholar who saw himself as knowledgeable about social sciences. What he failed 
to anticipate was the vigorous emergence of the question of judgment on a 
distinctively religious level. Together with many followers of liberalism and 
relativistic positivism, Rawls believed that the foundation of public reason would 
free modern societies from the grip of comprehensive doctrines. By contrast, what 
in fact happened is that the global village took a different direction. We do not know 
what the result of this trend will be. Today a clear opposition between the advocates 
of active judgment and those supporting a ‘deponent’ understanding of judgment is 
taking shape. The former are the heirs of a confident and self-sufficient model of 
rationality, largely centred on the role of verbal language (taken by semioticians as 
the crucial symbolic system). The latter are, by exclusion, all those who have been 
looking for alternative models. In this second group, I would include the proponents 
of the crisis of judgment as a possible way out of the dehumanization of the 
humanities; indeed, I would go so far as to say that the model of reason that emerges 
from their efforts is, thanks to the contribution of the Christian civilization of Late 
Antiquity, a model that in the icon finds the best alternative to the barren nature of 
the concept.  
Iconicity, as I have been arguing in the first part, shapes a path that is not 
entirely visible in the recent history of Europe, but has strong roots in Eastern 
Christianity and, through Byzantium, has been handed down to peoples that are 
linguistically and ethnically diversified: no language could have been more 
communicable than an iconic language. In this respect, the iconic nature of 
Christianity recovers in a virtuous way the iconic character of the ancient 
civilizations of theatre, without falling, however, into the fiction caused by the 
illusion of the stage. Judgment can be a central category for the globalized and 
digitalised late-modern world. And in this journey, the path indicated by the Fathers 
of the Church, by the Cappadocians and not by them alone, could turn out to be a 
precious antidote against the frustrations of reason and against the myths it fuelled, 
when it is idolized, namely the mythologies of a digital salvation of mankind. If we 
manage to stop looking at (dividing and divisive) the analytical model of reason as 
our golden calf and accept that we must seek for a more “liturgical” form of 
reasonable life, then the “iconophile” account of language offered by the Nicene 
fathers has helped us avoid the danger of idolizing—even without us being aware of 





46 Reference is made here to the germinal work by J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, 
Mass., Belknap, 1971. 
 
